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I. INTRODUCTION
Like much of Japanese law, Japanese intellectual property law is
often criticized as being inaccessible.
This inaccessibility has
contributed to the misperception that Japanese case law regarding
intellectual property does not exist. Even if it exists, the perception
goes, it takes forever to track down and it is nearly irrelevant.

* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; Visiting Fulbright Researcher,
Tokyo University, 2000-2001; Visiting Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law,
2001-2002. I am indebted to the Fulbright Program. I was able to spend the time
translating the cases in this Commentary only because of the financial support of the
Fulbright Grant that I received for the academic year 2000-2001.
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This Commentary, in a very modest way, is aimed at debunking the
myth that Japanese case law regarding intellectual property is either
non-existent or less meaningful than its U.S. counterpart. This
Commentary consists of five translations of recent, significant
intellectual property cases, as well as commentary regarding the
relevance and meaning of each case.
In the end, the most important objective of this Commentary is to
show in bright letters that Japanese case law on intellectual property
does exist and that it has a very rational and rich intellectual grounding.
Although the inaccessibility of actual opinions has been hard to
refute, in September of 2000 the Japanese Supreme Court added an
intellectual property category to its web page, www.courts.go.jp. In one
motion, this has drastically reduced, if not totally eliminated, the
appearance of inaccessibility. Now, sometimes even on the same day as
they are issued-as in the JACCS Case translated below, intellectual
property cases are posted on this cite in very easy to read, large
Japanese print.

II. MORAL RIGHTS CASE
Moral rights are given very broad protection in Japan. In the case
that follows, a young man produced an adult video tape of a video game
character developed by the giant game manufacturer Konami. To
enhance the association, the defendant even appears to have changed his
last name to be very similar to Konami's name.
A. Konami, KK v. Ichiro Komami

,

2

Formal Judgment
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.

The defendant is hereby enjoined from manufacturing, selling, or
distributing the Video Tape as defined herein;
The defendant is hereby ordered to destroy the master and all
copies made of the Video Tape as defined herein;
The defendant shall pay the plaintiff the sum of 2,275,000 yen plus
5% interest per annum calculated from July 19, 1998, until this
amount is paid in full;
The remainder of plaintiffs claims are hereby rejected;
Costs shall be divided into three parts. The plaintiff shall be
responsible for 2/3 and the defendant shall be responsible for 1/3 of
those costs.
The monetary awards of this opinion may be enforced provisionally.

1.
Konami, K.K. v. Ichiro Komami, 1696 HANREI JIH6 145 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug.
30, 1999) [hereinafter Konami Case].
2.
All translations herein were done by the author.
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Factsand Reasoning
I.

Plaintiffs Demands

The plaintiff [Konami, K.K.] demands that the defendant, Mr. Ichiro
Komami be enjoined from manufacturing, selling, or distributing his
Video Tape as defined below. The plaintiff also demands that the master
and all copies of that Video Tape be destroyed. The plaintiff further
prays for damages in the amount of 10,840,000 yen plus 5% per annum
calculated from July 19, 1998 until this amount is paid in full.
The plaintiff further demands that the defendant publish a letter
of apology in the national editions of the Asahi Newspaper, the Yomiuri
Newspaper, the Mainichi Newspaper, and the Nippon Keizai
Newspaper.
II.

Nature of Dispute

In this dispute, the plaintiff is the copyright holder to a video game
for use on a computer. The plaintiff claims that the defendant produced
an animated video that is based on the principal characters the plaintiff
created. This conduct, the plaintiff alleges, amounts to an infringement
of its copyrights (the right of reproduction and the right of adaptation)
and its moral rights (the right to preserve the integrity of a work). The
plaintiff has prayed for an injunction ordering the defendant to cease its
manufacture, sale, and distribution of its Video Tape and for specific
monetary damages.
A.

Facts (except for evidence to the contrary, these facts are stipulated
to by the parties)

1.

The Parties
The plaintiff-Konami, K.K-is a corporation that manufactures
and sells video games and other amusement devices.
The defendant-Ichiro Komami-is an individual who, under the
pen name "Shane," conceives, produces and sells on-the-spot
photographs, animations and parodies.
2.

The Plaintiffs Copyrightable Works
The plaintiff, through its employees, created a computer video game
titled 'Tokimeld (Heartthrob) Memorial" (hereinafter plaintiffs video
game). On May 27, 1994, it secured copyright and moral right protection
for plaintiffs video game.
The plaintiffs video game is a computer video game that simulates
life at "Kirameki High" for a Japanese boy. The object of the game is to
get the main character, Shiori Fujisaki, or another female student, to
express her love to the player of the game on graduation day. The
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plaintiffs video game is sold as one game for use on the Playstation
home entertainment system. (Plaintiff also sells its software for use on
PCs but has elected here to focus on the protection of its copyright as
used on the Playstation system.)
3.

Defendant's Conduct
The defendant, without the authorization of the plaintiff, created an
animation called "Dogimagi Imagination" using a likeness of Shiori
Fujisaki, the principal character in plaintiffs video game (herein
referred to as defendant's Video Tape). In January of 1997 the
defendant (on consignment) sold its Video Tape to the general public at
a store in Tokyo's Akihabara's district. Furthermore, after making sales
of its Video Tape, the defendant manufactured and sold serial copies of
its work.
III. Issues
1.

Does the Video Tape Infringe the Plaintiffs Copyrights or Moral
Rights?
The plaintiff claims that the defendant is using a likeness of Shiori
Fujisaki in its Video Tape. Plaintiff claims that it created the character
and made it popular. As such, the plaintiff claims that the defendant's
Video Tape infringes both its right of reproduction and its right of
adaptation under the copyright law.
Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's Video Tape
is an animated version of Fujisaki's likeness, portraying her engaged in
sexual conduct as a form of adult entertainment. As such, the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant tarnished the innocent image of Fujisaki, has
brought on a transformation of the plaintiffs video game and, therefore,
violates the plaintiffs right to preserve the integrity of the work [one of
the moral rights under the copyright act].3
The defendant counters that Fujisaki is a generic character lacking
sufficient originality to warrant copyright protection. The defendant
further contends that characters in the abstract receive no copyright
protection. As such, there is no infringement of the plaintiffs right to
reproduce the work.
Next, regarding the right to preserve the integrity of the work, the
defendant argues that a side-by-side comparison should be made and
that Fujisaki's image should not be part of the analysis. Even if
Fujisaki's image is part of the test to determine if this right has been
violated, defendant argues, Fujisaki's image-although an honor
student-is not innocent. In addition to the fact that the theme of
plaintiffs video game is love, it also conjures up images of lovemaking.
As such, Fujisaki's image is not innocent.

3.
Chosakuken ho [Copyright Act], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 59 [hereinafter
Copyright Act].
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Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs right of reproduction and its
right to preserve the integrity of the work are infringed, defendant
should not be found liable for copyright infringement because defendant
created the work in order to connect with his own counter culture.
2.

Damages

Regarding damages, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has
made a profit of 840,000 yen in selling its Video Tape. Plaintiff alleges
that it was damaged in that amount.
(This amount was calculated as follows: cost per video sold (1,400
yen) - production costs per video (300 yen) x the number sold (900) -

animation costs (150,000 yen) = 840,000 yen.)
The plaintiff further alleges that as the defendant's Video Tape has
created nearly irreparable injury to the innocent image of Fujisaki, an
image painstakingly created by the plaintiff, damages based on the right
to preserve the integrity of the work should be 10,000,000 yen.
As such, plaintiff claims a total of 10,840,000 yen in damages.
The defendant takes issue with the plaintiffs claim to monetary
damages. The defendant claims that if one takes into consideration all
production costs involved in making its Video Tape, it realized no profit
from its sales.
Furthermore, the defendant alleges that its production of its Video
Tape was done to defendant's tastes and was only done as a connection
to his own counter-culture; the plaintiffs demand for damages is
inappropriate.
Apology
The plaintiff alleges that its moral rights (the right to preserve the
integrity of the work) has been infringed by the defendant; it has a right
to demand that the defendant publish an apology in order to restore its
work's reputation.
The defendant contests this claim.
3.

IV. Judgment
A.

Infringement of plaintiffs copyright and moral rights

Copyright infringement
Based on the above facts, we hold as follows:
The plaintiffs video game is the fictitious simulation of a "Kirameki
High" from a male student's point of view. It consists of the experiences
of everyday life of a male student in his senior year at that school. When
certain conditions are satisfied by the player of the game, Shiori Fujisaki
or some other female student expresses her love to the player of the
game. In the plaintiffs video game, Fujisaki is the lead female
character. Fujisaki has a small, pointed chin and large, black pupils (the
area below the pupil is accented with red). Her bangs are short but her
1.
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hair in the back goes down to the middle of her back. She has reddish
hair tied up with a yellow ribbon. There is a white line where her neck
meets her breastbone. She appears to be the archetypical high school
student wearing a light blue uniform. Given the features of her
hairstyle and face, we hold that Fujisaki is an original literary creation.
In the defendant's Video Tape, a female high school student
appears. A large image of a high school student is drawn on the package
in which the video is sold. This girl has a small, pointed chin and large
pupils (the area under the pupil is accented with red). Her bangs are
short but her hair in the back goes down to the middle of her back. She
has reddish hair tied up with a yellow ribbon. There is a white line
where her neck meets her breastbone.
She appears to be the
archetypical high school student wearing a light blue uniform.
Comparing the plaintiffs version of Fujisaki with the female high
school student portrayed in the defendant's video, we hold that the
defendant's work is both a copy and an adaptation of the plaintiffs
character as the appearance, hairstyle, and uniform of the two
characters are essentially the same.
2.

Right of Integrity
As explained above (evidence omitted), the plaintiffs video game
consists of a love simulation in a fictitious high school called "Kirameki
High." Shiori Fujisaki appears in this video game as one of the
characters. She is portrayed as an honor student with an innocent, fresh
personality. Boys who play the plaintiffs video game enact everyday life
as well as school life. The game is comprised of a love relationship with
Fujisaki, but Fujisaki never engages in any sexual conduct.
On the other hand, defendant's video consists of the same scene
where the Fujisaki character professes her love to the player of the
game; however, in the defendant's version, after the expression of love,
the Fujisaki character, portrayed with an innocent personality, engages
in sexual conduct with a high school boy during a ten minute segment
clearly directed at an adult audience.
In the defendant's video, the name Shiori Fujisaki does not appear;
however, the viewer of the video would recognize the character as Shiori
Fujisaki for the following reasons:
•
The character that appears on the defendant's package and the real
Fujisaki resemble one another down to the minutest detail. They
have similar features, their long black hair trained to the left, their
necks are bent in the same angle, even their hair shares the same
white highlights.
*
The defendant's package contains a similar title ("Dogimagi
Imagination"), the packaging uses the same design and color
lettering and uses the same blue background.
*
On the video, it says, "Confess your true feelings." This is done to
explain the association with the plaintiffs video game.
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Therefore, the defendant has violated the plaintiffs right to
preserve the integrity of the work by portraying the plaintiffs character
in a context where she is performing sex acts.
We also reject the defendant's contentions that he produced his
video only as a way to connect with his own counter-culture and his
claim that the Fujisaki character is uncopyrightable and therefore not
infringed.
3.

Summary
Therefore, we find grounds to support plaintiffs contention that the
defendant be enjoined from producing or distributing its video tape and
that all copies of it be destroyed.
B.

Calculation of Damages

1.

Damages Based on the Copyright Infringement Claim
The evidence shows that defendant produced and sold 500 copies of
its video tape for 1,400 yen each, or a total gross revenue of 700,000 yen.
The defendant paid 200,000 yen to a director and voice actors but did the
writing and animation himself. Duplication fees came to 175,000 yen
(each tape cost 350 to duplicate). The defendant also paid 50,000 yen for
packaging. The total costs the defendant incurred were 425,000 yen.
Therefore, the defendant realized 275,000 yen in profits from the
manufacture and sale of its Video Tape. The defendant also claims that
he incurred additional costs such as the cost of a personal computer and
animation software to produce his Video Tape. It is not appropriate,
however, to consider such indirect costs and so they have been excluded.
Therefore, we hold that the amount of damages the plaintiff
suffered as a result of the defendant's infringement was 275,000 yen.
2.

Damages Related to the Right of Integrity
The evidence establishes that the plaintiffs video game was a large
success. By March of 1998, it sold 1,200,000 copies of the game and it
had become a very popular video game. In 1997 the game won various
software awards in Japan. The lead character of the game, Shiori
Fujisaki, became very well known. In 1997 Shiori Fujisaki was selected
as the most popular fictional character in a video game. As a derivative
work, plaintiff produced a CD of Shiori Fujisaki singing popular songs.
The plaintiff manufactured and sold a host of merchandise related to the
game. Stills from its video game appeared in movies. The plaintiff has
also published novels on these characters. In all of this, Shiori Fujisaki
is portrayed as an honor student, innocent and pure.
The result of the defendant's conduct, however, which violated the
plaintiffs right of integrity was to turn the innocent and pure Shiori
Fujisaki into a base, crude character as one might expect in an adult
oriented video animation. Defendant intentionally created a character
that would tarnish the work created by the plaintiff.
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As such, plaintiff has been damaged to a substantial degree. To
compensate plaintiff for the damages incurred by the plaintiff in this
regard, we award plaintiff 2,000,000 yen.
3.

Total
Therefore, in total, we award plaintiff 2,275,000 yen in total.

V.

Conclusion

Therefore, we hold in favor of the plaintiff as stated above. There
no
need to publish an apology under these circumstances.
is
B. Konami Case Commentary
This case raises several interesting copyright related issues.
Perhaps the most striking issue is the idea that a corporation can
possess moral rights and that they might be infringed. Usually, moral
rights are individual rights that are inalienable and survive sale or other
transfer. 4 Therefore, corporations are usually not eligible for moral
rights as there is no true "author" in the personal sense.
In the Konami Case, the court does not specifically mention this
issue. The court does note, however, that Konami, "through its
employees," created the work in question. 5 The court seems to be
vaguely showing that, in the end, people created the work on behalf of
the plaintiff corporation, not the corporation itself. If that truly is the
court's position, however, then the individual employee-authors ought
to be the moral right claimant, not the corporation.
As in France, moral rights in Japan are inalienable. 6 Therefore, the
corporation itself, technically, does not own the moral rights at issue
here. They are owned, to the extent they exist, separately by the
individual employees who created the game program. That is likely a
large number of people. Perhaps this is why the court conveniently
lumps the moral rights into all the rights owned by Konami and does not
raise the matter further.
Putting the ownership issue aside, the court in the Konami Case
addresses the right of integrity of the work. It finds for the plaintiff and

Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers., Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
4.
(BNA) 2021 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is undisputed by the parties that moral rights are
inalienable and unassignable.'); 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 137
(1994); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right. Is an American
MarriagePossible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1,5 (1985). See generally 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY §§ 272-287 (1938); 2
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21 [A], at 8-249 (1978);
Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrineof MoralRight: A Study in the Law of Artists,Authors and
Creators,53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 559-72 (1940).
5.
Konami Case, supranote 1.
6.
Copyright Act, supra note 3.
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finds 2,000,000 yen in damages based on this count. This amount is, in
fact, the bulk of the award. If not for the moral rights claim, the
damages would have been a paltry 275,000 yen. 7 This should
demonstrate the potential significance of the moral right. The ironic
aspect of this award is that the court is essentially ordering the
defendant to pay damages so that the plaintiff might recover the
reputation of a cartoon character.
The copyright infringement analysis of the case is in keeping with
standard copyright infringement analysis in the United States. The
court first considers whether the plaintiffs work is original and then
whether the defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiffs
work The court finds not only similarity but actual copying. It engages
in a detailed, fact-specific inquiry one would expect and arrives at the
obvious conclusion: the defendant copied and therefore owes the plaintiff
damages.
Contrary to popular opinion, courts in Japan usually do not order
public apologies even though many statutes allow it and many plaintiffs
pray for it. This case is no exception. The plaintiff demanded an
apology, and the court dismissed it as inappropriate. If apologies ever
were granted by Japanese courts, this case would have been a likely
candidate. What better way to start repairing the reputation of the
plaintiffs video game character? The fact that the court refused to order
a public apology even in this case indicates how truly reluctant Japanese
courts are to order apologies.
Finally, in a post-decision development, the Japan Weekly Monitor
on October 30, 2000 reported that Konami, K.K. and two securities firms
would offer a new mutual fund, the yield of which is linked to sales of
Tokimeki Memorial and a New Tokimei Memorial video game.8 The
greater the revenue produced by sales of the games, the higher the yield
for investors.9 The Japan Weekly Monitor quoted Toshiro Tateno,
Konami senior managing director saying that 'Those investing in the
production of the software would develop greater affection for the games
themselves and that may have the side effect of producing greater
sales."10

7.

Using the recent exchange rate of V123.14 to $1.00 (U.S.). V275,000 equals

$2,233.23. See Key Currency Cross Rates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2001, at C15.

8.

Mizuho, Monex to Sell Mutual Fund Based on Sales of Software, JAPAN

WEEKLY MONITOR, Oct. 30, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.

9.
10.

Id.
Id.
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III. DILUTION
In 1993, the Japanese Unfair Competition Prevention Law was
u
amended to protect "well-known appellations of source.""
Article 2-1-2
of that amended law reads as follows: "[An act of unfair competition is
defined as] the act of using an appellation of source which is the same as
or similar to the well-known appellation of source of another .... 1 , 2 This
is the Japanese dilution provision even though it does not use that word.
Prior to the enactment of this amendment, trademark owners
whose marks were diluted still prevailed over alleged diluters on the
bases of unfair competition in general or on interesting judicial
expansions of the trademark law. The Walkman Case below is one such
example.
13
A. Sony, K.K. v. Yugen Kaisha Walkman

Formal Judgment
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

The defendant shall cease use of the trade name "Yugen Kaisha
Walkman" or 'Valkman" [in katakana]14 on or in connection with
the sales of shoes or clothing.
The defendant shall immediately commence proceedings with the
Chiba Corporate Name Registry to cancel the trade name "Yugen
Kaisha Walkman."
The defendant shall cease use of the word "Walkman" on all
packaging, receipts, signs, and advertisements.
The defendant shall discard all advertising material bearing the
trademark 'Walkman" including all packaging, receipts, signs, and
other advertisements.
The defendant shall pay the plaintiff the sum of 3,000,000 yen plus
5% per annum until the total amount is paid.
The defendant shall bear all costs for this litigation.

11.
Fusei kyoso boshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Law], Law No. 14 of 1934,
amended by Law No. 47 of 1993.
12.
This simple translation is actually a good example of the trouble one has in
translating Japanese legal concepts into English. The phrase I have translated as
"appellation of source" is, in fact, not very literal. The Japanese phrase is shohinnado
hyoji. This is often translated as "indications on goods and other indications." Literally,
the phrase reads "product, etc., indicators." These two options do not communicate the
intent of the phrase. The cases bear out that the real intent of the phrase is to protect the
source identifying function of marks or other source denoting aspects of a product. Thus,
I translate the phrase as "appellation of source" even though it is not literal.
13.
Sony, K.I v. Yugen Kaisha Walkman, 1598 HANREI JIHO 142 (Chiba Dist. Ct.,
Apr. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Walkman Case].
14.
Katakanais squarish Japanese syllabary used for foreign words.
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Reasoning
I.

The Defendant Does Not Dispute Claim Number 1 (Standing) or 2
(The Nature of Plaintiffs Trademark Right) of the Complaint

II.

Claims Regarding the Trademark Law

1.

Count 3 of the Complaint (Defendant's Use of Trademarks)
The parties stipulate that, as is stated in Count 3 of the Complaint,
the defendant makes use of certain trademarks, namely the word
"Walkman" both in English letters and in katakana. Furthermore,
according to the evidence, such use of these trademarks is done pursuant
to the conditions enumerated below.
The parties further stipulate that the defendant operates a small
store that sells shoes and clothing and that all products sold by the
defendant are manufactured by vendors other than the defendant and
that such vendors attach their trademarks to such products prior to
selling them to the defendant.
Upon making a sale, the defendant wraps the goods in paper, places
them in a polyethylene bag and hands the purchased goods to the
customer. The customer carries its purchased products home in such
bag. The plaintiff claims that this bag with wrapping is used in
connection with the sale of the goods. This bag is roughly 60 centimeters
by 35 centimeters and is the color yellow. In red on both sides of the bag
appears the word "Walkman," in both English letters and in hatakana,
in letters approximately 20 centimeters across. These words are
communicated to the public in this manner as the customer carries the
bags home. Finally, on the bags between the words '"alkman" in
English letters and in katakana appears the following words in fine,
small, red print: "Sneakers & Sports, Brand Shop" in katakana.
The cash register receipt is generated automatically by the register
and records the transaction. This receipt is given to the customer. The
date, amount of money tendered, and the change due are all recorded on
this receipt. Across the top of the receipt, the word "Walkman" in
katakana appears in small type and in larger type appears the word
"Walkman" in English.
The price tag is attached to the articles being sold in the store and
bears the price of the good. On the price tag is printed not only the price
but also the word 'Valkman" in katakana.
The advertisements introduce the customer to the products being
sold, bear a photograph of the goods, their brand names, size, color, and
price. On the back of these advertisements in rather large type appears
the word 'Valkman" in English letters and to the right of this appears
incomparatively small type the word 'Walkman" in katakana. Also on
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these advertisements appear the defendant's hours of operation, its
telephone number, and a small map showing how to locate the store.
Both in the store and on the exterior of the store building the
defendant has placed a rather large sign. The sign indicates the
products and brands the store carries and the defendant's telephone
number. The sign also bears the words "Walkman" in both English
letters and in katakanain large, yellow print outlined in black so as to
be noticed by customers. There are also banners placed near or around
the store. These banners also bear the words 'Valkman" both in
English letters and in katakana written in yellow letters with black
outlining. The store's awning is placed immediately above the entrance.
It, too, bears the words 'Valkman" in English letters and in katakana
written in yellow with black outlining so as to be noticed. A map of the
neighborhood has been erected very near the defendant's store. It
indicates that the defendant's store is very near. On this sign, next to
the words 'Walkman" both in English letters and in katakana, appear
the words "immediately in this direction" above an arrow.
a. The bags in which the defendant places its goods [which bear the
words 'Valkman" in English letters and in katakana] play the dual
function of being a carrying device for the customers and also to
advertise the defendant's products. Therefore, the act of placing the
defendant's goods in these bags and handing them over to the customer
can be appropriately considered conduct which advertises the
defendant's products pursuant to Articles 2-3-2 and 2-3-7 of the
Trademark Law. Furthermore, the cash register receipts can be
considered use of the mark in distribution of the goods pursuant to
Article 2-3-7 of the Trademark Law. Also, use of the price tags as
described above constitutes use of a trademark as contemplated under
Article 2-3-7 of the Trademark Law.
Finally, the defendant's
advertisements and signs can be considered use of a trademark under
Article 2-3-7 of the Trademark Law.
b. The defendant argues that it is inappropriate to consider its acts as
use of a trademark because in all instances it intends to merely express
the nature of its business and the store's name and to describe its
goods. Furthermore, according to counsel for the defendant, 'Walkman"
is an abbreviation of the defendant's registered legal name of its
store. Therefore, because the defendant is a small shop selling shoes and
clothing and because all of the products it sells are manufactured by
others and bear the manufacturers' trademarks, even if it places the
words 'Valkman" in English letters or in katakana on bags containing
those products, purchasers or other consumers realize that these are not
marks that identify the manufacturer of the goods.
Although the defendant's marks are identical to one portion of its
legal name, they are not identical to its entire legal name but merely an
abbreviation of it. Because there is no evidence to indicate that such
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abbreviation identifies the defendant, one cannot say that the
defendant's marks merely express the defendant's legal name. Also,
because the defendant's marks are pictorially designed representations,
they would usually not be used merely to identify a company's legal
name or the store's name. Therefore, it is difficult to say that these
representations merely identify the defendant's legal name or its store's
name especially because the defendant's use of the word "Walkman" in
katakanais in such a designer script. Furthermore, the defendant's use
on its bags, etc. as described above is done in large letters and in a
manner to be noticed by customers. Therefore, defendant's use of such
marks in such manner does not merely identify the defendant's legal
name or the store name. Finally, the defendant's use of the words
"Sneaker & Sports, Brand Shop" on its bags is not sufficient to dissuade
this court from this judgment.
One objective of using trademarks is the function of distinguishing
one maker's products from another's. This function of trademarks is not
only to identify the maker's goods and distinguish its products from
others, but also to identify a consistent source of the relevant goods
based on the seller's reputation. The defendant's use of the marks on its
bags, however, represent products sold by the defendant and the
relevant goods chosen by customers based on the defendant's reputation.
As such, these marks are not used to distinguish the defendant's
products from those of another. Use of the marks on the cash register
receipts and the advertisement bills effects the same result. Similarly,
because the defendant uses its signs in order to advertise its goods and
to show where the store is located, these signs do not have the function
of identifying the goods sold by the defendant based on the defendant's
reputation.
Therefore, we reject each of the defendant's arguments stated
above.
2.

Count 3-2 of the Complaint (Similarity Between the Plaintiffs
Marks and the Defendant's Marks)
Comparing the defendant's trademarks with the plaintiffs, we
conclude that they are similar in sound, meaning, and appearance.
Initially, we note the following distinguishing points on how the relevant
marks are used: (1) The defendant's mark consisting of the word
"Walkman" in English incorporates a design of a shoe whereas the
plaintiffs does not; (2) the defendant uses the word "Walkmian" in
stylized print while the plaintiffs mark is in block print; (3) and under
the plaintiffs mark 'Valkman" appears the word 'Valkman" in
katakana while the defendant's mark does not. Regarding (1) above,
however, the defendant's design merely consists of a generic rendition
of a shoe. Furthermore, as the plaintiff argues and is further explicated
below, the plaintiff has been using the term "Walkman" as a trademark
since July of 1979 on or in connection with the sale of cassette tape
recorders. Since that time, because of the mass media's attention to the
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mark and a near explosion in sales, by 1980 the trademark "Walkman"
had become a well-known trademark. Therefore, when a consumer is
confronted with the word 'Walkman," the sound and meaning of the
mark cause a very strong association with the plaintiff. Based on this
fact, we find that the shoe design which is part of the defendant's
trademark is merely an auxiliary part of the mark and not a
predominant part of the mark and therefore cannot serve to distinguish
the defendant from the plaintiff. Regarding points (2) and (3) above, we
find that there is no difference in the sound, meaning, and appearance
of the plaintiffs marks and the defendant's marks.
Based on the above stated grounds, we hold that the defendant's
mark consisting of the English word 'Valkman" is similar to at least two
of the plaintiffs marks incorporating the same English world.
Defendant's mark in katakana is also similar to at least two of the
plaintiffs marks. Even though the plaintiffs marks include the English
word "Walkman" and at least one of the plaintiffs marks consist solely
of the English word 'Walkman," this fact provides no obstacle to a
finding of similarity in sound, meaning, and appearance because people
in Japan would generally consider the sound and meaning of the mark
in katakanaor in English to be identical because the mark "Valkman"
has achieved such fame.
3.

Plaintiffs Count 3-3 (Similarity of the Goods)
The plaintiffs registrations classify its marks under Class 17 and
22 of the old classification system, while the defendant sells shoes and
clothing [and has not registered its marks]. There is no dispute between
the parties regarding this point. The defendant sells polo shirts, Tshirts, and other shirts, coats, blue jeans, walking shoes, jogging shoes,
and campus shoes. The defendant's goods clearly fit within the
classifications stated above. The defendant argues that its goods fall
under Class 24 of the old classification system which included sporting
shoes and clothing. Sporting shoes, however, consist of shoes not usually
used by people in their everyday lives such as ski boots, mountain
climbing shoes, and baseball spikes. The defendant does not sell any
such product. Also, sporting clothes are clothes used while engaging in
some sporting activity. Again, the defendant does not sell such goods.
4.

The Count for an Injunction
As explained above, the defendant's use of its marks infringes the
plaintiffs trademarks. Therefore, the defendant is hereby enjoined from
using the word 'Valkman" in English or in katakanain connection with
the sale of its goods.
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5.

Destruction of Infringing Goods
The defendant is also hereby ordered to destroy all infringing
packaging.
6.

The Claim for Damages
As the defendant has infringed the plaintiffs trademark rights
pursuant to Article 37 of the Trademark Law (Article 103 of the Patent
Law) ever since it established its business, we conclude that the
defendant adopted such trademarks in a negligent manner. The plaintiff
argues for the application of Article 38-2 of the Trademark Law
[Presumption of Damages] and argues that the appropriate damages are
at least one percent of the total value of all sales made by the defendant.
Pursuant to Article 38-2 of the Trademark Law, a person
adjudicated of infringing the trademark right of another may be required
to pay damages. Under Article 38-2, such damages are defined as the
customary amount that would have been paid in royalties had a license
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant. Therefore, we hold
that, pursuant to Article 38-2, the defendant shall pay the plaintiff the
reasonable and customary royalty normally charged by plaintiff for such
use, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff claimed such damage and
whether or not there was specific evidence to demonstrate such actual
damages. The defendant shall pay, as was prayed for by the plaintiff,
one percent of its total gross sales in damages because the plaintiffs
mark was famous, the plaintiff was actively commercializing and
protecting its mark, and the plaintiff had licensed the mark to Sony
Industries, KIK. for a five percent royalty to manufacture and sell a wide
range of goods now sold by defendant. Furthermore, because the
defendant infringed the plaintiffs mark in the packaging and
advertising of all of its products, damages should be determined
accordingly. The parties do not dispute that in 1990 the defendant's
total gross sales amounted to 220,000,000 yen; in 1991 gross sales
amounted to 270,000,000; and in 1992 gross sales amounted to
432,000,000 yen for a total sales amount of 922,000,000 yen. One
percent of that total is 9,220,000 yen.
The attorneys fees and costs for this case incurred by the plaintiff
in the amount of 900,000 yen should appropriately be borne by the
defendant as a consequence of its infringement.
Therefore, because the plaintiffs prayed-for-damages of 3,000,000
yen is within the scope of damages as articulated above, the plaintiffs
demand for damages in the amount of 3,000,000 yen plus interest of five
percent per annum calculated from the date this suit was broughtJanuary 17, 1992-until the entire amount granted is paid.
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III. Claims Under the Unfair Competition Prevention Law
1.

Applicable Law
The plaintiff further demands an injunction pursuant to the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law ordering defendant to have its corporate
name, '"Walkman Yugen Kaisha" canceled. There are no provisions in
regard to such an injunction in the Trademark Law. Therefore, we next
shall address the subject of this injunction and cancellation of the
registered trade name under the Unfair Competition Prevention Law.
Although the amendments to the Unfair Competition Prevention
Law which took effect on May 1, 1994, include in Article 2-1-2 a very low
standard for the definition of use of a famous appellation of source and
amended Articles 3, 4, and 5 permit a claim for an injunction, Article 3
Supplemental of that same law states that the provisions of Articles 3 to
5 shall not apply retroactively to conduct that commenced prior to the
effective date of the amendments. Therefore, the provisions of the
Unfair Competition Prevention Law as amended that address the use of
famous appellations of source do not apply to this case.
For purposes of determining when an injunction is appropriate,
Article 2-1-1 provides the conditions describing what use of well-known
appellations of source fall under the Unfair Competition Prevention
Law; Article 3 defines when an injunction is appropriate. The law as
articulated at bar should apply here unless there are some special
provisions to the contrary. It is difficult to find such special provisions
in the amended law (see amended Article 2 Supplemental). Therefore,
the determination of the injunction in this case should be made pursuant
to the Unfair Competition Prevention Law as amended. (It should also
be noted that the old law and the amended law do not differ regarding
the requisite conditions for issuing an injunction.)
2.1 Plaintiffs Count 4-1 (Similarity of Products or Appellations of
Source)
The defendant has conceded that the word 'Valkman" in katakana
is a famous representation of the plaintiffs goods in Japan. Therefore,
it also concedes to the following factual determination.
The plaintiff is a company famous both in Japan and abroad as a
company that sells primarily electronic goods.
It succeeded in
developing a miniaturized cassette tape player in 1979. These goods
were unique in that they allowed the user to listen to music while they
walked. The mark 'Walkman" is derived from the English verb which
means "to walk" and the noun "man" which means "person." These two
words put together form the mark "Walkman." The plaintiff sells its
cassette tape players bearing this mark. These goods arrived on the
market in July of 1979 and were the subject of a venerable explosion in
sales. The name "Walkman" became a frequent subject of stories on
television, newspapers, and in magazines. Thereby, these goods became
representative of the goods manufactured by the plaintiff. Therefore, by
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mid-1980, the plaintiff became famous both in Japan and abroad as the
manufacturer of these cassette tape players.
As the plaintiffs trademarks became famous, the plaintiff began
engaging in activities to protect and to license such marks. As such, it
entered into a license agreement with Sony Industries, MMK., a 100%
solely-owned subsidiary. Through this subsidiary, it began licensing the
use of its marks for the manufacture and sale of a wide range of products
including shoes and clothing such as the defendant sells, but also
including eye glasses, lunch boxes, beverages, range finders, and walking
distance meters. Sony Industries, K.K. realized the following results
after entering a license agreement with the plaintiff regarding shoes and
clothing products similar to the defendant's goods.
a.

Shoes
From January 1, 1983 until December 31, 1990, Sony Industries,
MK. was under a sublicense agreement with Hiroshima Kasei Kabushiki
Kaisha for use of the "Walkman" trademark; from March 1, 1986 until
March 31, 1989, it was under a sublicense agreement with Toyo Rubber
Kabushiki Kaisha for use of the '"alkman" trademark; and from April
1, 1989 until March 31, 1992, it was under a sublicense agreement with
Toyo Rubber Industries Kabushiki Kaisha for use of the 'Walkman"
trademark. Such sublicensees sold shoes in the normal channels of
trade bearing the 'Walkman" trademarks. The sales results of such
activities are as follows:
Hiroshima Kasei, KI:
1983
198715
1988
1989
1990

=
=
=
=
=

Total

= 260,661,530 yen

Toyo Rubber,

39,405,000 yen
50,978,280 yen
39,203,020 yen
63,133,940 yen
26,878,000yen

MK.:

1986 = 37,562,234 yen
1987 = 28,459,696 yen
1988 = 45,717,000 yen
Total = 111,738,930 yen

15.
Translator's note: the gaps in the dates are in the Japanese original and were
unexplained- These gaps obviously affect the total.
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Toyo Rubber Industries, K.K.:
1989 = 31,734,180 yen
1990 = 45,387,970 yen
1991 = 6,788,010 yen
Total = 83,910,160 yen
b.

Clothing
From January 1, 1984 until December 31, 1993, Sony Industries,
K.K. was under a sublicense with Seiwa Kabushiki Kaisha to use the
'Walkman" trademark on neck ties, mufflers, and other neck wear; from
January 1, 1983 until December 31, 1985, it was under a sublicense
agreement with Mitsui Bussan Kabushiki Kaisha to use the mark
'Walkman" on vests, pants, shirts, etc.; from January 1, 1983 until
February 31, 1985, it was under a sublicense agreement with Kabushiki
Kaisha Mataichi Yoko to use the mark 'Walkman" on sweaters and Tshirts; from April 1, 1983 until December 31, 1985, it was under a
sublicense agreement with Kabushiki Kaisha Daikenseni to use the
mark Walkman" on various types of shorts.; from January 1, 1983 until
December 31, 1986, it was under a sublicense agreement with Fukusuke
Kabushiki Kaisha to use the mark 'Walkman" on socks. The total
resulting sales from all of these sublicenses are as follows:
Seiwa, K.K.
Mitsui Bussan, K.K.
K.K. Mataichi Yoko
K.K. Daikenseni
Fukusuke,K.K.

=
=
=
=
=

53,981,000
99,012,325
128,166,040
24,251,016
54,967,260

yen
yen
yen
yen
yen

In each of the above sublicense agreements, appropriate provisions
are provided for quality control, inspection, and advertising of the
sublicensed products bearing the mark 'Walkman."
By 1989, the plaintiff created a chain of regional stores. In order to
increase sales of goods bearing the "Walkman" trademark, it allowed
electronic stores around Japan to use the mark '"Walkman Pro
Shop." By February of 1992, ninety-seven such stores were using this
mark in Japan-two of these stores were in Chiba City where this
litigation commenced.
In response to a request by the plaintiff, in March of 1992 K. K.
Densan conducted a survey according to the Telephone Survey Law to
determine if consumers made a connection between the "Walkman"
trademark and Sony as a famous name and to determine if there was an
apprehension that consumers would associate "Yugen Kaisha Walkman"
with the plaintiff. The sample population of the survey consisted of 500
individuals from high school to age 40 who lived in Tokyo or Chiba City.
They were asked questions such as 'What type of product do you think
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of when you hear the word 'Walkman'T' And "Who makes such
products?" In Tokyo 41% of the respondents, and in Chiba City 48.5%
of the respondents, said that 'Walkman" referred to a portable
tapeplayer and that Sony made the product. Of that population, 42.3%
of those living in Tokyo and 27% of those living in Chiba City responded
incorrectly regarding the product but correctly identified Sony as the
manufacturer. Therefore, of those respondents living in Tokyo, 83.3%
associated the mark "Walkman" with Sony, and of those respondents
living in Chiba City, 76% associated 'Walkman" with Sony.
Based on this analysis, it is clear that the word "Walkman" and the
word as an appellation of source has become famous nationwide as a
representation of the plaintiffs well-known goods. Furthermore, it is
also clear from this analysis that this appellation of source has come to
identify the plaintiff.
2.2 Count 4-2 (The Defendant's Goods and its Appellations of Source)
There is no dispute between the parties regarding the defendant's
goods or its appellations of source.
2.3 Count 4-3 (Similarity Between the Plaintiffs Appellations of Source
and the Defendant's Appellations of Source)
The 'Walkman" portion of the defendant's appellations of source are
identical in sound to those of the plaintiffs.
2.4 Count 4-4 (Apprehension of Confusion Between the Plaintiffs and
the Defendant's Products or Appellations of Source)
Acts which cause confusion pursuant to Article 2-1-1 of the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law, as amended, are defined as the use of an
appellation of source which is the same as or similar to another's famous
appellation of source-the name associated with a person's business, a
trade name, trademark, a product's packaging, or other representations
of a product or business. Such conduct is not actionable merely because
it causes consumers to mistakenly believe that the defendant's goods or
its business is one in the same with the plaintiff, but also includes
conduct that causes an apprehension of confusion as to the relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant, to believe they are parent and
subsidiary company, to believe the defendant is a licensee of the
plaintiff, or to believe they are structurally or economically related.
Furthermore, the plaintiff need not be in competition with the defendant
before such conduct is actionable.
Therefore, based on the above analysis, the consumers generally
believe as follows:
* The appellation of source "Walkman"' has become exceedingly
famous in Japan;
There is a close connection between the word "Walkman" as a
coined term or as a indication with the plaintiffs products;
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Many people associate the appellation of source "Walkman" with
the plaintiff;
*
The word "Walkman" has been licensed for use on a wide range of
goods;
These goods include shoes and clothes, the precise products on
which the defendant uses the appellation of source;
* Through quality control of products bearing the appellation of
source "Walkman" and through advertising, a close association has
been made in consumers' minds with the plaintiff and Sony
Industries, K.K.; and
*
The plaintiff is closely involved in the use of its famous appellation
of source on famous products.
Therefore, we conclude that there is an apprehension that the average
consumer would believe that, if the defendant used the word "Walkman"
as part of its trade name in connection with its business activities or on
its goods, there was some sort of special relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant, either in a structural, economic, or business
sense.
Therefore, when this type of confusion occurs, we find that there is
an apprehension that the defendant infringes the source denoting
function of the mark, the consistent quality function of the mark, and
the ability of the plaintiff to attract customers. Therefore, it is
appropriate to conclude that there is an apprehension that the
defendant's conduct infringes the value of the plaintiffs business
pursuant to Article 3-1 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law.
The defendant argues that because the mark "Walkman" is not a
famous mark for use on shoes and clothes-the products it sells-there
is no apprehension of confusion or of an infringement of the value of the
plaintiffs business. When broadly applying the Unfair Competition
Prevention Law in finding an apprehension of confusion and an
apprehension of an infringement of the value of the plaintiffs business,
however, it is not a condition precedent that the mark also be famous as
used on the products the defendant sells. Therefore, we reject the
defendant's argument in this case.
Furthermore, the defendant argues that as a mere small shop
selling shoes and clothing, there is not an apprehension of confusion
because it is clear that the defendant is not a licensee of the
plaintiff. We cannot conclude, however, that the plaintiff would not
enter a license with a shop such as the defendant's. Therefore, we reject
this argument as well.
Finally, the defendant argues that because Article 11-1-3 of the
Unfair Competition Prevention Law, as amended, states that an
injunction shall not issue against the user of a appellation of source
which is the same or similar to that of another unless it was adopted
with illicit purposes, in December of 1985 when the defendant adopted
the mark "Walkman" the mark had not become famous for goods other
than cassette tape players, it was led to believe that it could use the
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mark on shoes and clothing. The evidence here, however, shows that the
appellation of source 'Walkman ' had become famous in Japan even
before the defendant adopted the mark. Furthermore, the broad
application of the law in this case stems from the fact that the
defendant's conduct will assuredly cause an apprehension of confusion
and an apprehension that consumers will mistakenly believe that there
is some special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant
regardless of whether the parties are in competition. Therefore, because
the parties need not be in competition and a finding of fame of the
relevant appellation of source in this case is appropriate, we reject the
defendant's arguments.
Accordingly, the defendant may not use the words "Walkman"-that
are identical to the plaintiffs famous products and appellations of
source---on or in connection with the sale of its goods or in connection
with its business. Furthermore, it may not use the word "alkman"
within its trade name as used in connection with its business.
Therefore, the plaintiffs motion for a permanent injunction is
granted. Also, the plaintiffs motion to cancel the defendant's registered
corporate name is also hereby granted.

4.

Conclusion
Accordingly, as we have held in favor of the plaintiff, Article 89 of
the Code of Civil Procedure shall be applied to the allotment of costs [in
finding defendant responsible for such costs].

B. The Walkman Case Commentary
In the Walkman Case above, the Chiba District Court very broadly
interpreted and applied both the Trademark Law and the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law. In applying the Trademark Law, the court
found that the defendant's use of the word 'WValkman" on signs, bags,
and packaging used in connection with its small shoe and clothing store
infringed Sony's registered trademarks, 'alkman"
(in English) and
"Walkman" in katakana. The court also found such conduct to violate
the Unfair Competition Prevention Law as the defendant had used the
plaintiffs famous appellations of source to create an apprehension of a
misimpression in the minds of the consumers that there was some
association between the plaintiff and the defendant. The key to this case
for both counts was whether defendant's actions amounted to "use" of a
trademark or appellation of source.
To answer that in the affirmative, the court really stretches the
notion of "use." Using the store's name on a price tag would usually not
be considered use of a trademark, especially when the product also bears
the real trademark of the manufacturer of that article, and the parties
are not in competition with one another. The court here, however,

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

868

[VOL. 34:847

aggregates all the trademark-like uses to conclude that an average
consumer would take the overall impression of all of the uses of
'Valkman" into consideration and believe some affiliation with Sony.
This case is important for several reasons. First, in analyzing the
trademark infringement claim, the court focused on whether the
defendant's conduct interfered with the functions of Sony's
trademarks. This is a good example of how Japanese courts address
trademark infringement. Rather than the mark being infringed, they
are more concerned with whether the functions behind the mark are
infringed.' 6 The functions identified here include the source denoting
function, the consistent quality function, and the reputation of the
plaintiff.
The second important proposition this case stands for is that in the
application of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law, the defendant
need not be in direct competition with the plaintiff before an injunction
is proper. Here the defendant argued that it was not competing with
Sony and that any person looking at its store and packages would know
that Sony was not selling shoes and clothing in this small store in Chiba
City. The court entirely rejected that argument. It found that when the
marks or appellations of source are famous, the scope of protection is
very broad. Therefore, even though the court found some minimal
overlap in use of the 'Walkman" trademarks by sublicensees of Sony, it
also stated that such a finding is unnecessary in issuing its injunction.
Finally, and perhaps rather significantly, the court relied on a
survey conducted by Sony. Japanese courts very rarely rely on survey
evidence in trademark cases. 17 The problem in this case is that the
survey was conducted by the plaintiff for reasons not directly related to
this litigation. The court does not critically analyze its validity or
reliability, but does appear to rely on the survey results.
Although the Chiba District Court is not considered to be the
leading court in Japan for trademark cases, this Walkman Case
exemplifies much of the Japanese analysis of trademark infringement.

IV. PRODUCT CONFIGURATION

Perhaps one of the more interesting developments in Japanese
intellectual property law was the inclusion in the 1993 amendments to
the Unfair Competition Prevention Law, prohibitions against copying
product configuration for three years after the product's introduction to

16.

For a more detailed analysis of this point, see KENNETH L. PORT, JAPANESE

TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE 87-88 (1998).

17.

Yuriko Inoue, Kodo no osore no rissho to anketochosa [Proofof Likelihood of

Confusion and Surveys],

in

CHITEIKIZAISAN

NO CHORYU

[CURRENT

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] (Institute of Intellectual Property ed., 1995).

TRENDS

IN
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the market.1 8 This statute prohibits these actions even without notice
and without any registration or other claim to ownership by the plaintiff.
The amended statute reads in relevant part as follows:
[An act of unfair competition shall be defined as] the act of making exact
or near exact copies of another's product, provided the product

configuration is not the general shape of such products and, in the case of
unique goods, the function and use of such good shall not be
protected .... 19

The next case establishes the likely parameters of this new, sui
generisform of intellectual property.
20
A. Matsui Corporation,KK v. Shaday, KK.

Formal Judgment
1.

2.
3.

4.

I.

The defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
2,041,117 yen or, commencing on February 1, 1996, one fifth of that
amount per annum until the full amount is satisfied.
The remainder of the plaintiffs demands are rejected.
Costs of this litigation shall be divided in five. The plaintiff shall be
responsible for four fifths and the defendant shall be responsible for
one fifth of those costs.
The provisions of item number 1 above may be enforced
provisionally.
Order

The defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
2,041,117 yen or, commencing on February 1, 1996, one fifth of that
amount per annum until the full amount is satisfied.

18.
Fusei kyoso boshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Law], Law No. 14 of 1934,
amended by Law No. 47 of 1993.
19.
Id. art. 2-1-3.
20.
Matsui Corporation, IK. v. Shaday, K.K. (Osaka Dist. CL, June 18, 1998), at
http-J/courtdomino2.courts.gojpfchizai.nsf/Listview0/lBFOCE2F33053F5A49256936000A
1 A5B/?OpenDocument (last visited April 29, 2001) [hereinafter Bearl Club Case].
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1.

Plaintiffs Sales
The plaintiff has been selling a towel set (as evidenced in the
attachments below) bearing the words "BEAR'S CLUB" since June of
1994.
2.

Defendant's Sales

a. The defendant has been selling towel sets-as evidenced by the
attachments below demonstrating its old towel sets and the new towel
sets-bearing the words "DECOT BEAR'S COLLECTION" since May of
1995.
b. During the period of August of 1995 to January of 1996, the
defendant also sold a separate towel set. We shall refer to all of these
products collectively as "defendant's goods."
B.

Plaintiffs Demands

The plaintiff claims that the defendant's goods are exact replicas of
its goods. As such, it claims that such conduct constitutes acts of unfair
competition in violation of Article 2-1-3 of the Unfair Competition
Prevention Law. Plaintiff further demands that the defendant pay
damages that resulted from such conduct.
C.

Points of Contention Between the Parties

1.
2.

Are defendant's goods merely copies of plaintiffs goods?
Does the shape of plaintiffs goods themselves infringe the
trademark rights of another? And, if they do, can plaintiff still
protect those shapes under the provisions of Article 2-1-3 of the
Unfair Competition Preventions Law?
Is the defendant infringing the rights of the plaintiff?
What damages are owed to the plaintiff?

3.
4.

III. Detailed Description of the Points of Contention Between the
Parties
[omitted]
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IV. Judgment
A.

Regarding the Claim that the Defendant's Goods are Copies of the
Plaintiffs Goods

1. Pursuant to a comparison of the evidence as shown in the
attachment below and the party's arguments at bar, we hold that the
shape of the defendant's goods (including the packaging and the rattan
basket in which the product is sold) is a copy of the shape of the
plaintiffs goods. Furthermore, both the defendant's goods and the
plaintiffs goods are presented to and purchased by the consumer in the
same packaging and encased in a rattan basket. Therefore, it is
appropriate to consider the shape of the goods to be the focus of this case.
2.

Regarding the Fact that the Defendant's Goods are Identical to the
Plaintiffs Goods, We also Conclude as Follows:

When viewing the plaintiffs goods from the front when the goods
still wrapped in its box, the most significant impression one gets of
goods is that of a teddy bear and a towel with the bear imprinted on
towel all placed together in a large box.
The size, shape, and color of the defendant's teddy bear is identical
to that of the plaintiffs goods. Furthermore, both the defendant's teddy
bear and the plaintiffs teddy bear are wearing red cone-shaped hats
with a white tassel near the bear's left ear. Both bears also include a
round towel hanger attached to the respective bear's chest area. These
are the primary characteristics of each bear and are designed to attract
the attention of the consumer. Therefore, we conclude that the teddy
bears' shapes are, for all practical purposes, exactly the same.
The defendant points out that the accessories included with its
goods and the color of its towel hanger are different from the plaintiffs
First considering the
goods and thereby distinguish its goods.
accessories, however, these differences are immaterial. The defendant's
goods include a bag and the plaintiffs goods do not. Both bears' color
combinations include red and white and the overall appearance of the
two products are the same, however. Therefore, these differences are
insignificant. Furthermore, the differences between the respective towel
hangers is also immaterial. Admittedly, the defendant's towel hanger
is brown and the plaintiffs towel hanger is reddish brown. Taking into
consideration the nearly identical features of the goods, however, such
as the size, shape, and adornment of the goods, and considering the
overall similarity between the goods, the differences the defendant
points out are irrelevant.
The towels included in the defendant's goods which include a
picture of a teddy bear are very similar to the plaintiffs goods as
well. Both parties' goods include a white towel bearing a picture of a
cute teddy bear. The teddy bears are brown. The color of the clothing
a.
are
the
the
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and hat on the bears are red, blue, green, and yellow. The word "bear"
as part of a logo appears prominently on the towels of both parties.
These elements consist of the primary parts of the products and give the
greatest commercial impression on the buyers.
As the defendant points out, there are differences in the color, size,
shape, and numbers of the bears adorning the parties respective
towels. These differences, however, do not relate to the most significant
commercial aspect of the products. Taking into consideration the nearly
identical nature of the goods as explained in sub-part (a) above, the
differences the defendant has identified are trivial.
Therefore, we conclude that the defendant's towels as well bear a
striking similarity to the plaintiffs towels.
The composition of the teddy bear and the towel, as shown by the
evidence, are identical and their sizes are nearly identical. Furthermore, although the teddy bears are on opposite sides of the packages as
presented by the plaintiff and the defendant-that is, the defendant's
teddy bear is sometimes placed on the right side of the packaging while
the plaintiffs teddy bear is placed sometimes on the left-this difference
as well cannot be considered significant.
Also, it becomes apparent when comparing the defendant's goods
with the plaintiffs goods that another difference exists. That is, some
of the defendant's towel sets include a pink dish cloth with red and white
hearts placed in the lower portion of the container.
The existence of this dish cloth and other differences in color or
patterns are not imperceptible. Both the plaintiffs goods and the
defendant's goods, however, consist of a towel set based on a cute teddy
bear motif. Each includes a teddy bear of almost exactly the same size
placed either to the left or right of center or in the middle of a rattan box.
The dish cloth is completely irrelevant to the teddy bear motif.
Therefore, with or without the dish cloth, we conclude that the
defendant's goods are identical in their overall appearance.
Furthermore, both the plaintiff and defendant's goods include a
rattan box. Each uses the color scheme of red, white, and bluealthough some patterns are different. Even the way the packages are
wrapped in plastic and the way the goods are attached to the inner boxes
are the same.
b. The defendant claims that because of the differences in colors in
accessories being held by the teddy bear or towel or dish cloth, the
plaintiffs goods appeal to men while the defendant's goods appeal to
young women. Certainly, if one only looks at the differences in the
pictures of teddy bears on the towels, one is likely to get the impression
that the defendant's towel sets are oriented to young women and not
men. The first impression of both the plaintiffs goods and the
defendant's goods, however, is the cute towel set placed in a teddy bear
motif. The different impression argued for by defendant is only observed
upon close inspection.
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c. We therefore conclude that the evidence sufficiently shows that the
defendant's goods are factually identical to the plaintiff's goods.
3. The plaintiff commenced sales some eleven months before the
defendant. The testimony of Mr. Sotome demonstrates that the
defendant used the plaintiffs goods as a specific reference when
designing its goods. Considering this and the fact that although it could
have manufactured a towel set looking like anything else, the defendant
chose to make one that looked exactly like the plaintiffs, we conclude
that the defendant purposefully copied the plaintiff's product when it
manufactured its own goods.
4. Therefore, we hold that the defendant copied the goods of the
plaintiff.
B.

Do the Shape of the Plaintiffs Goods Themselves Infringe the
Trademark Rights of Others and, if so, Can the Plaintiffs Goods be
Protected Under the Article 2-1-3 of the Unfair Competition
Prevention Law?

1. Pursuant to the evidence submitted to the court, we hereby find the
following facts:
a. The plaintiff's towels bear the logo "Bear's Club" and is visible
without opening the package. This logo is the name of the product.
b. The clothier Marutaka is the owner of a registered trademark
"Bear's club."
c. Marutaka Clothier became aware of the current litigation by
reading a newspaper article. As such, Marutaka Clothier claimed that
this use by the plaintiff actually infringed its registered trademark
rights. The plaintiff settled that claim on December 11, 1995. Pursuant
to that settlement agreement, the plaintiff admitted its conduct
constituted an infringement and agreed to pay Marutaka Clothier 3% of
its gross sales (150,293,200 yen) or 4,588,596 yen.
d. Subsequent to its settlement with Marutaka Clothier as explained
above, the plaintiff changed its logo to "Bear's Trio."
2. Therefore, the defendant claims that because the plaintiff
admittedly infringed the trademark rights of Marutaka Clothier in its
use of the logo "Bear's Club" on its products, it cannot now take
advantage of the provisions of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law
to protect the overall shape of the product (a portion of which is the very
logo of another).
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Even if the victim of an act of unfair competition infringes the
trademark rights of another, however, this fact should not prevent him
from enforcing its valid rights under the Unfair Competition Prevention
Law. In order to protect fair competition between business, the Unfair
Competition Law presumptively regulates all forms of unfair
competition. The unfair competition law must be interpreted this way
so that its true objectives might be realized. Furthermore, the issue of
trademark infringement is a matter between the plaintiff and a third
party unrelated to this litigation. There are other laws that are
sufficient to provide remedies in this regard. Certainly, when the victim
of unfair competition is itself an infringer of someone's trademark rights,
it is insufficient merely to leave it to litigation between the trademark
owner and the victim of the unfair competition. When the illegality of
the unfair competition is clear, it is appropriate to focus on the unfair
competition law and allow the victim to seek its damages even if it had
been an infringer of a third party's trademark rights.
As was stated in the findings of facts above, the plaintiff infringed
Marutaka Clothier's trademark rights when it used the logo "Bear's
Club." This logo was one portion of the plaintiffs overall product and did
not consist of the overall appearance or shape of plaintiffs goods. Only
two months after receiving Marutaka's claim, the plaintiff settled that
matter while this litigation progressed. While changing their products
and their logos, plaintiff settled with Marutaka and paid damages to
Marutaka. Such circumstances should not hinder the plaintiffs ability
to seek protection under the Unfair Competition Prevention Law.
3.

As such, we dismiss all of defendant's arguments.

C.

Infringement

Pursuant to the testimony of the plaintiffs representative, the
plaintiffs goods and the defendant's goods are in actual competition in
the market place. Therefore, we hold that plaintiff is being damaged by
the defendant's acts of unfair competition.
The defendant argues that since the plaintiffs goods infringe the
registered trademark rights of Marutaka Clothier and, as such, all sales
inure to the benefit of Marutaka Clothier, the plaintiff is not damaged
in any compensable form by defendant's actions. As was stated in part
B above, however, the matter of trademark infringement is to be
determined separately between Marutaka and the plaintiff herein; that
matter has, in fact, been settled by those entities, and the plaintiff has
even agreed to pay damages. Therefore, defendant's conduct does rise
to a compensable offense vis-a-vis the plaintiff.
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Damages

1. In this litigation, the plaintiff is asking for damages according to
Article 5-1 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law. The parties
stipulate that the defendant sold its goods described herein generating
a total gross revenue of 69,184,000 yen.

[The court then fixed damages as follows: total revenue generated
(69,184,000 yen) minus the cost of producing the goods (58,266,000 yen)
minus advertising costs (9,276,883 yen) equals the total compensable
damages (1,641,117 yen)].
3. Further costs incurred by the plaintiff in enforcing its rights herein,
including attorney's fees and other costs, totaled 400,000 yen.
4.

Therefore, total damages in this case are 2,041,117 yen.

V.

Conclusion

Therefore, the defendant is hereby order to pay the plaintiff the sum
of 2,041,117 yen or commencing on February 1, 1996, one fifth of that
amount per annum until the full amount is satisfied.
It is so ordered.
B. Gibson Guitar Corporationv. Fernandes,KK 2 1
[Another way to protect product configuration is through Article 2-1-1
(confusion) of the UCPA and Article 2-1-2 (dilution). The Gibson Guitar
Case defines the parameters of protecting product configuration under
these two alternative avenues. Gibson Guitar Corporation sued its rival,
Fernandes, KMKY, for trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair
competition. Fernandes concedect that it had intentionally "referred to"
Gibson's Les Paul guitar but that by the mid-1990s the shape of the
guitar had essentially become generic in Japan. The Tokyo District
Court held in favor of Fernandes and Gibson appealed.]

21.
Gibson Guitar Corporation v. Fernandes, FK., 1719 HANREI JIHO 122 (Tokyo
High Ct., Feb. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Gibson Guitar Case].
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Formal Judgement
-This appeal is denied.
-Costs of the appeal shall be the responsibility of the appellant.
-The parties have 30 days to appeal this ruling to the Supreme Court.
Reasoning
II.

Appellant's Goods

A.

The Fame of the Product Configuration of Appellant's Goods

1. Pursuant to testimony and arguments made in court, we find as
follows:
a. In 1902 Gibson's predecessor company, Gibson Mandolin Guitar
Manufacturing Company, was established. Under the name "Gibson,"
this company became known for manufacturing guitars and
mandolins. Since approximately 1937, Gibson started manufacturing
and selling electric guitars. As the boom in electric guitars that
commenced in the United States in approximately 1945 grew, Gibson
made efforts to manufacture and sell more electric guitars as well. In
1950 Gibson began planning the release of an electric guitar named after
the famous musician named Les Paul. In 1952 Gibson began
manufacturing and selling an electric guitar bearing Les Paul's name
(hereinafter the Les Paul guitar). Subsequently, Gibson made minor
changes to the configuration of the Les Paul guitar and began
manufacturing and selling the electric guitar [references to evidence and
exhibits has been deleted without further indication].
b. In the 1950s a new style of music called rock and roll was born in
the United States. Using the electric guitar, rock music uses a dynamic
(that is, an energetic, up-tempo) rhythm. As such, it allows musical
expression in a lively manner. The electric guitar has became the
symbol of rock music and rock music made it possible for the electric
guitar to be a solo instrument. Rock music became very well known
among young people and enjoyed a very serious following. Therefore,
with the boom in rock and roll music in the United States and Britain in
the 1960s, the number of people who purchased electric guitars rose as
well.
c. As stated above, Gibson was manufacturing electric guitars prior to
1960; however, in 1961 Gibson had a falling out with Les Paul and
ceased manufacturing that model guitar.
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d. The guitar style being manufactured and sold by Gibson up to 1960,
especially the 1958 model, became the favorite guitar of Jimmy Page, a
well-known guitar player with the famous rock band called Led Zeppelin.
Also, the 1959 model became the favorite guitar of Mike Broomfield,
also a famous guitar player in the United States. Other well-known
musicians, including Eric Clapton, Jeff Beck, Duane Allman, Peter
Green, and Mick Taylor, began using the Les Paul guitar at concerts. As
such, the Les Paul guitar became the center of attention and it became
popular with other rock musicians and fans.
e. Various rock musicians and fans alike came to demand the
reintroduction of Les Paul guitar. In response to this demand, Gibson
reintroduced the Les Paul guitar in 1968. At this time, Gibson's product
configuration of its guitar became famous in America and Britain as the
shape of electric guitars used in the rock industry.
f.
Rock music became popular in Japan via music magazines, record
sales, and other means. The performers mentioned above, Jimmy Page,
Eric Clapton, Jeff Beck, Duane Allman, Peter Green, and Mick Taylor,
also became popular in Japan. Jimmy Page, Eric Clapton, and Jeff Beck
became especially popular.... [Popularity standings in Japan indicate
that rock music featuring the electric guitar became very popular in
Japan from 1970 to 1972.]
g. The magazine called Music Life carried photographs and interviews
of rock musicians using the Les Paul guitars. Specifically, in 1971 and
1972, the rock bands called Grand Funk Railroad and Credence
Clearwater Revival used the Les Paul guitar in their concerts
throughout Japan. As is stated above, the electric guitar symbolizes
rock music and rock gave birth to the electric guitar solo. Moreover, the
configuration of the electric guitar played prominently in the performers'
guitar solos. As such, fans could not avoid noticing which electric guitar
the performer was using and, therefore, the configuration, color, and
appearance of the guitar rock musicians used became popular in Japan
as well.
h. By 1969 Gibson had reintroduced its guitar and started
manufacturing it again. Around this time it was imported into Japan;
however, because the guitar was expensive, the average rock band could
not afford the guitar and so actual sales volume was small. This did not
stop well-known music stores from putting the guitar on exhibition in
their shops nor prevent the guitar from becoming the object of rock fan's
admiration and desire.
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i.
Other efforts to copy the Les Paul guitar in Japan can be
summarized as follows:
Soon after Gibson reintroduced its guitar in 1968 and 1969,
Genraku Kiten, K.K. introduced its Lou Cass guitar bearing the brand
name "bands" in katakana which was a dead copy of the Les Paul guitar.
In 1970 Kanda Shokai, K.K. introduced its guitar bearing the
GRECO brand under the model number "EG-360" (selling at 36,000
yen each) which was a dead copy of the Les Paul guitar. By 1974
this company had introduced twelve guitars under the "EG" series
which were dead copies of Les Paul guitar (selling from 38,000 yen
to 80,000 yen each). By 1977 this company was selling nineteen
different guitars which were dead copies of the Les Paul guitar
(selling from 38,000 yen to 100,000 yen each).
*
In 1974 Teisco, K.K. was selling three different guitars under the
TEISCO label which where dead copies of Les Paul guitars (selling
at 36,000 yen each).
*
By 1976 Nippon Gakki Seizo, K.K., using that company's label
"yamaha," sold twelve different guitars which were dead copies of
the Les Paul guitar (sold at 38,000 yen each).
*
In 1972 Fernandes began manufacturing electric guitars in earnest
and by 1976 sold-under the label of "bunny"-a guitar that was a
dead copy of the Les Paul guitar (at 90,000 yen each).
*
There were many other companies in Japan who sold other dead
copies of the Les Paul guitar under various company logos.
*
In magazine advertisements taken out by Fernandes in 1974,
Fernandes makes the following claim regarding the "bunny" series
guitar: "Take another look at the Gibson of the 40s and 50s." In
the March 1981 issue of the "Guitar Magazine," Fernandes claimed
"the most accurate [guitar] revival ever." In an instrument
catalogue published in 1982, Fernandes described its guitar as '"he
Bunny RLG150, the standard model of 1959." In the May 1997
issue of Guitar Magazine, "Fernandes is in Japan! This model is
that desired model that even Fender or Gibson couldn't get their
hands on. This is the Eric Keys series who is a famous rock star.
Many thanks to Fernandes." [The point of this advertisement is
that guitar players in 1970 who could not afford Gibson or
Fernandes' original models must have purchased Fernandes' copy
model.] As such, Fernandes has intentionally sold its guitars as
copies of the Les Paul guitar.
Perhaps at least ten manufacturers using thirty brand names have
manufactured and sold copies of the Les Paul guitar under numerous
brand names. These companies openly stated through advertisements
that their guitars were copies of the Les Paul guitar.
In Japan, professional rock musicians or aspiring musicians since
1970 would go all the way to the United States in order to purchase a
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real Gibson guitar rather than purchasing one of the numerous copies
available to it in Japan.
2. [These facts establish that] the product configuration of Les Paul
guitar had become famous in Japan by 1973 and well recognized within
the rock music industry by both fans and performers.
Fernandes, however, does not provide sufficient evidence to support
[its claim that the shape of the guitar had become functional and that
foreign-made parts made its guitars cheaper in Japan.] Rather, it is
clear from the facts articulated above that Fernandes actually took
advantage of the fact that the Les Paul guitar had become famous in
Japan as well as in the United States and Britain .... Therefore, we
find no merit to Fernandes' argument.
Fernandes argues that in order to manufacture a guitar, it did not
adopt the product configuration of the Les Paul guitar;, rather, it adopted
the shape of a guitar necessary to create an impression on the public,
much as "APP" made an electric guitar that resembles Gibson's Les Paul
guitar in 1942 and as Bigsbie Co. did in manufacturing and selling a
single cutaway guitar resembling the Les Paul guitar in 1948.
It is clear from the evidence that Fernandes, in fact, did began
manufacturing a guitar resembling the Les Paul guitar in 1942 through
another entity and that Bigsbie, Co. manufactured and sold a single
cutaway guitar that resembles the Les Paul design in 1948; however,
compared to Gibson's guitar, the same evidence indicates that these
guitars were not similar to the Les Paul guitar. As such, Fernandes'
arguments are without merit.
Fernandes' other arguments are, similarly, without merit and are
therefore dismissed.
B.

Dilution

Gibson's Les Paul guitar became well known among rock musicians
and fans in Japan at least by 1973. We also have found above that this
product configuration has come to represent Gibson's goods in the music
industry.
We have also found, however, that since at least 1973 Gibson's
product configuration no longer represented the source or origin of any
good. That is, for over 20 years more than 30 different brands were
being used to sell guitars that resembled appellant's product
configuration. During this period, Gibson admits that it took no steps
to curb such use. Therefore, it is impossible to say that consumers
recognize the source of the Les Paul guitar simply by looking at the good.
Thus, consumers would not remember the particular source of the
guitars merely by looking at their shape.
On this point, Gibson argues that the dead copies being
manufactured and sold in Japan were knowingly placed in the stream
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of commerce as dead copies. The manufacturers were passing these
products off not as their own goods but as those of Gibson's. As such,
these copies in the stream of commerce diluted Gibson's ability to use the
product configuration to identify it as the source of the goods. Therefore,
Gibson argues that the Les Paul shape neither actually lost its ability to
identify Gibson as the source of its guitars.
The reality, however, is that the consumers recognize Gibson's
guitar as one of the many copies and, as such, Gibson's guitar
configuration does not function to identify a particular source of the
goods; rather it now identifies many sources of the particular goods.
Gibson argues that consumers, upon being confronted with the Les
Paul guitar, confuse the configuration of the goods with the source of the
goods. This, however, simply is mistaken. Even if consumers, when
confronted with the Les Paul guitar, know that it originated with
Gibson, and even if they know a copy from the original, they do not
believe that all guitars shaped like the Les Paul model originated with
Gibson.
C.

Tort

Making dead copies of another's product configuration is prohibited
by the Unfair Competition Prevention Law. If such conduct exceeds the
scope of fair competition, it will be adjudicated to be a tort and
Fernandes will have to pay damages.
As stated above, Fernandes intentionally attempted to take
advantage of the level of customer recognition enjoyed by the Les Paul
guitar. To do this, it manufactured and sold an elaborate copy of the Les
Paul guitar. Except for extraordinary cases where the victim does not
object to such copying, such conduct would generally be considered
unfair competition. Therefore, Fernandes' conduct of intentionally
copying and continuing to copy the Les Paul guitar should be considered
to be acts of unfair competition and therefore constitute a tort against
Gibson.
To the extent that such acts of copying exceed the accepted scope of
free and fair competition, however, the victim of such conduct must take
appropriate measures to seek redress.
Most importantly in this case, the copying of the Les Paul guitar by
Fernandes and others happened over a period of some years. As a result,
the product configuration of the Les Paul guitar became the favorite and
well-known shape for an electric guitar and, as such, ceased to satisfy
the source identifying function. In that sense, as was stated in the
opinion below, the Les Paul guitar, by 1993, had become a standard
design for electric guitars-a fact Gibson did nothing about for over
twenty years.
On one hand, the facts plainly show that, in these circumstances,
neither old nor new manufacturers of guitars in Japan felt any
particular restriction regarding copying the Les Paul model.
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At the same time, Gibson argues that its product configuration has
been diluted by the use of the same or very similar guitar
designs.... As stated above, however, Kanda Shokai, MK. and other
companies were not only selling the Les Paul copies, they had also set up
branch stores in Japan to focus on the sale of such copies. We cannot
ignore these facts.
In this manner, the copying done by Fernandes during the three
year period provided for by the Unfair Competition Prevention LawSeptember 3, 1993 to September 2, 1996-does not satisfy the elements
of this cause of action even if this copying occurred after the parties
became competitors.

II.

Gibson's Claims

Therefore, as Gibson's claims are without merit they are
dismissed. The opinion below is appropriate and therefore it is
affirmed. As Gibson has not prevailed, the award of costs and the term
to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court shall be governed by
Articles 61 and 96-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
C. Commentary on the Bear's Club Case and the Gibson Guitar Case
From a U.S. perspective, this new Article 2-1-3 product
configuration is rather unusual. As mentioned in the Bear's Club Case,
the law protects a product's shape even though the defendant had no
prior notice of the claim of ownership and even though the owner did not
register or take any other affirmative steps to state a claim of ownership
to the respective shape. In the very least, this is a rather peculiar
development.
On the other hand, as expected, the Japanese courts appear to be
doing a rather good job narrowing what might otherwise be rather
expansive new rights. The Gibson Guitar Case is a good example of
drawing some specific limitations to the dilution and confusion
rationales for protecting product configuration. That is, the shape of the
Les Paul guitar had become, essentially, generic as used in Japan. As
such, the court denied Gibson's attempts to monopolize the shape it had,
for certain, developed years before.
The Gibson Guitar Case, however, demonstrates how potential
plaintiffs may view this new legislation regarding dilution protection of
product configuration. Attorneys for Gibson were perfectly aware of the
expansive use of the Les Paul guitar shape in Japan. Even with this
knowledge, they elected to file suit and litigate the case to this
conclusion.
The case on the merits does not appear to be very strong given the
amount of use in Japan and Gibson's lack of previous enforcement
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efforts. Therefore, the Author contacted both Gibson and Fernandes and
asked them the motivations behind the suit given the apparent
weakness of the case on the merits.
Gibson declined comment.
Fernandes kindly instructed its attorneys to reply. Their response,
in part, was as follows:
During the 1970s, according to the facts [sic] finding of the judgment, more
than ten Japanese Guitar makers manufactured and sold guitars with
shapes similar to Gibson's "Les Paul." Gibson had not taken any action
against these products until Gibson sent a demand letter to Fernandes
and sued Fernandes in 1993. You might assume the reason as follows:
Gibson's products were high-grade ones with prices of 300,000 yen or more
(even in the 1970s) and domestic makers' products were much lower
graded with prices principally around 50,000 yen. Thus, consumers were
definitely separated between Gibson and such Japanese makers and there
was no competition between them. It rather seems that Gibson took the
"flood" of cheaper products of Japanese makers as good advertisement for
Gibson's "Les Paul." However, after the change of management of Gibson
in 1986, Gibson extended its business to the market of such cheaper
products, through its second or third brand such as "Epiphone" and
"Orville." Thus, competition newly arose between Gibson and the
Japanese makers, and Gibson changed its policy to exclude such
22
competitors from the market by making use of unfair competition law.

That is, it appears that Gibson used the amended UCPA as a tool to
carve up market share and exclude competitors or increase the cost of
market entry for new competitors. This is precisely the result one would
expect reading the expansive nature of the statute. Regarding Article
2-1-3 of the UCPA, Japanese courts also seem to be limiting the so-called
"dead copy" law to situations of actual, intentional copying such as in the
Bear's Club Case above.

V. CYBERSQUATTING

The following case is Japan's first cybersquatting case that has
made it through the courts to a final decision. JACCS, the plaintiff, is
a fairly well known credit card company but not famous to the extent of
a MasterCard or Visa. Nevertheless, the court here found JACCS to be
famous enough to warrant the injunction.

22.
E-mail from Mr. Takeshi Kikuchi, Esq., to Professor Kenneth L. Port (Dec. 6,
2000) (on file with author).
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A. KK. JACCS v. Nihonkai Pakuto23
FormalJudgment

1.
2.
3.

The Defendant shall cease commercial activities using the domain
name "JACCS" on its Internet web page.
The defendant shall cease using the domain name "%wv.jaccs.co.jp"
which it registered with the Japanese Network Information Center
on May 26, 1998.
The defendant shall be responsible for the costs of this litigation.

Facts and Reasoning

II.

Nature of Dispute

A. In this case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant's use of the term
JACCS both as part of its domain name and as a business appellation
within its web page constitutes a violation of the Unfair Competition
Prevention Act (Articles 2-1-1 and 2-1-2) and, as such, prays that the
defendant be enjoined from use of the domain name and that the
defendant be ordered to cease use of the term JACCS as an business
appellation within its web page.
B.

Stipulated Facts

1.

Parties
The plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the credit card business;
the defendant is a privately held corporation engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and lease of toilets.
2.

Domain names
Domain names are the method by which a computer connects to the
Internet. They must be limited to thirty-two English letters. An
Internet user can connect with a specific web page by entering the
domain name.
Each country has an Internet information center which maintains
domain names by not allotting identical domain names to different
parties. In accordance with international practice, the system of priority
is employed so that the entity to receive a specific domain name is the

23.
K.K. JACCS v. Nihonkai Pakuto (Toyama Dist. Ct., Dec. 12. 2000), at
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jplchizai.nsf/ListviewOV131223C563AFFFF5E49256AOOOO
1EBD20?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 29, 2001) [hereinafter JACCS Case].
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entity that applied for it first. In Japan, the Japan Network Information
Center (JPNIC) allots domain names. The gTLD (Generic Top Level
Domain Name) designate ".co" is allotted to general commercial entities
that satisfy the following conditions: the applicant is a registered
corporation; the applicant's domain name is not identical to any existing
domain name; and the domain name will identify a single
corporation. When these conditions are met, JPNIC assigns the domain
name to the first applicant [without conducting any further
analysis]. As there is no requirement that the domain name be the same
as the corporate name, the domain name applicant is free to choose its
domain name and file its application. If the above conditions are met,
JPNIC generally issues the domain name. Domain names can consist
of English letter A to Z (case non-specific) and the single digit numbers
of 0 to 9 and hyphens. Domain names, such as "www.abc.co.jp" consist
of several levels. The country code consists of the ".jp" which stands for
Japan. 24 The generic top level domain name ".co" is used to identify the
general commercial nature of the registrant. The ".abc" portion is known
as the secondary level domain name. The designate to connect to the
World Wide Web is "www." In this case, we shall refer to the secondary
level domain name simply as "the domain name."
Defendant's Domain Name Registration
On May 26, 1998, the defendant was assigned the domain name
"www.jaccs.co.jp" (hereinafter referred to as defendant's Domain Name).
3.

Defendant's Web Page
On or about September of 1998 the defendant established its web
page. [References to specific evidentiary exhibits deleted throughout.] On
the web page, below the title "Welcome to JACCS' web page," the
following links were provided: "Goods;" "Digital Cell Phone;" and
"Nippon Kaisyo, K.K." The links consisted of advertisements of the
defendant's cheap toilets and cellular telephones.
Subsequently, the defendant amended the web page so that JACCS
was spelled out in katakana [in an apparent attempt to avoid confusion
with the "jacks" pronunciation adopted by the plaintiff.]
By the time this case was tried, it is conceded by both parties that
the letters "JACCS" no longer appeared on the web page.
4.

Translator's note: in the original Japanese, the court describes the domain
24.
names in a confusing manner. The "country code" is identified as the "top level" and the
"gTLD" is described as the "secondary level." This description has been modified to be in
compliance with an international understanding of domain names.
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C.

Plaintiff Alleges as Follows:

1.

Enjoin Defendant's Use of Defendant's Domain Name

a. The plaintiff has continuously used the logo "JACCS" (pronounced
'Jacks" and written as such in katakana-that is, 'Jakusu") since
1976. This shall be referred to as "plaintiffs trademark" herein.
Plaintiffs trademark appeared on all credit cards it produced and on its
Through television and newspaper
employees' business cards.
commercials, "JACCS" has become a famous and well-known business
appellation identifying the plaintiff to consumers all across Japan.
b. The term "appellation of source" as used in Article 2-1-1 and Article
2-1-2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law refers to appellations
used on goods which identify the source of the good or the specific
business related to the good. Domain names [satisfy this definition
because] they are essentially computer addresses. Domain names are
not random letters; rather, they are intentionally chosen by the
registrant. It is well known by Internet users that domain names
usually consist of the registrant's business name. As such, they also
have the function of distinguishing the registrant's goods and services
from those of others.
Furthermore, the defendant's conduct constitutes "use" of the
"appellation of source" because it has attempted to market the Domain
Name with the intent to make a exorbitant profit (the defendant actually
asked for a personal meeting with the plaintiff and persistently sent
letters to the plaintiff). The defendant has also created and used a web
page bearing the Domain Name with the intent to facilitate the sale of
its goods. Also, prior to the commencement of this litigation, the
defendant used the JACCS portion of the Domain Name on its web page
to advertise its goods-such as cellular telephones and cheap toilets, and
even now uses it in the links connected to its web page to advertise
shoes, etc. Considering this conduct by defendant, it should be
adjudicated as having "used" the "appellation of source."
b. The Domain Name is identical or similar to plaintiffs business
appellation even if used in lower case letters.
c. As such, Internet domain names are not merely unique computer
addresses and "business" is not limited to the goods and services of a
specific corporation. Rather, if the term "JACCS" is used in the web
page of the defendant, Internet users will mistakenly believe that the
If
site is operated by the plaintiff or an affiliated company.
advertisements for specific products appear on links connected to this
web page, such use of the Domain Name and development of the related
web page will cause confusion with the plaintiffs business.
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d. Therefore, the defendant's use of the Domain Name constitutes an
act of unfair competition in violation of Articles 2-1-1 and 2-1-2 of the
Unfair Competition Prevention Law and plaintiff is suffering damage
due to such conduct. As such, pursuant to Article 3-1 of the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law, the plaintiff demands that the defendant
be enjoined from further use of the Domain Name.
[On identical grounds, the plaintiff also requested an injunction
preventing the defendant from using the term "JACCS" on or in
connection with its Internet activities.]
D.

Defendant's Allegations

1.

Defendant's Use of the Domain Name

a. A domain name is essentially just a computer address. An Internet
user looks at the domain name and then connects with a web
page. Furthermore, once connected, although a site might be
commercial, it might be related to the public good or for
hobbies. Therefore, just because a site uses the ".co" designation, it is
not necessarily a commercial appellation of source. Also, even if specific
products or services are presented on a specific web page, the domain
name itself appears only in a small blank space in the upper part of the
screen. Furthermore, the products and services offered by defendant do
not appear on the same screen as the initial domain name but rather on
separate pages [using different URLs]. Therefore, the Domain Name
does not indicate the source or origin of some good or service.
b. As a domain name only serves to identify the computer address,
even if it also distinguishes the registrant's goods or services, whether
a domain name constitutes "use" of an "appellation of source" should be
determined by looking at the contents of the web page and the nature
and form of the use of the domain name itself.
In the immediate case, the defendant currently uses "JACCS" on
the web page to clearly identify a business other than the plaintiffs and
does not use the domain name to distinguish its goods from those of
others. As such, it does not "use" the "appellation of source" [and
therefore cannot be said to be engaged in unfair competition as it is not
using the domain name in commerce].
2.

Defendant's Use of "JACCS" in its Web Page

a. The defendant's use of "JACCS" and the plaintiffs Trademark
(JACCS) are distinguishable.
The plaintiffs Trademark is
predominantly green and the defendant's use is predominantly red,
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yellow, and blue. There are clear differences in the style of typeface
used. Therefore, the impression or image a user gets from the two are
completely different. Furthermore, on defendant's web page, its
pronunciation in kanc 2 5 is now added so that no one could not confuse

the two pronunciations. [That is, defendant pronounces its mark "jay-ayshee-shee-esu" and plaintiff pronounces its mark 'Jacks."]
b. Also, as only links appear on the web page where "JACCS"appears,
defendant is not using it for commercial purposes.
3.

Abuse of Rights
Domain name registrations are done on purely a priority basis. The
registrations are further limited to only the letters or numbers that can
be used as domain names. As such, companies that use the Internet
compete to apply for domain name registrations or settle disputes for
large sums of money. In this given situation, without any heed to the
priority system, based only on the fame of its trade name or its
registered trademark, [plaintiff] inappropriately demands that the
defendant cease use of the Domain Name.
In order to make a web page for a collection of various companies,
the defendant received the endorsement of approximately 10 companies
and filed for and received a domain name registration for "JACCS"
which stands for "Japan Associated Cozy Cradle Society" [English in

original].
The plaintiff has been conducting business on the Internet using the
domain name "www.jaccscard.co.jp:" Plaintiff will not be inconvenienced
whatsoever even if it cannot use the Domain Name (jaccs.co.jp).
E.

Issues in Dispute

1. Does the use of a domain name constitute "use' of "an appellation
of source" as contemplated by Articles 2-1-1 and 2-1-2 of the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law?
2.

Are the other conditions of Article 2-1-2 of that law satisfied?
* Is the plaintiffs appellation of source famous?
• Is the Domain Name in dispute here the same or similar to
plaintiffs appellation of source?

3.

Are the other conditions of Article 2-1-1 satisfied?

4. If an injunction regarding the use of the Domain Name is
appropriate and issued, will this constitute an abuse of rights?

25.
Kana is the abbreviated word for katakana and hiragana-thetwo Japanese
syllabaries.
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5. Should defendant be enjoined from using "JACCS" anywhere on its
web page?
III. Judgment
A. Does the use of a domain name constitute "use" of "an appellation
of source" as contemplated by Articles 2-1-1 and 2-1-2 of the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law?
1. The parties concede that a domain name is a code entered into a
computer for the purpose of reaching a specific web page. They concede
that the domain name applicant must choose its domain name limited
to letters in the English alphabet and single digit numbers. They also
concede that the domain name will issue unless there is a previous,
identical domain name registration in existence. Finally, the parties
concede that the domain name does not have to be the same as or related
in any way to the name of the registrant.
Rather than electing a domain name that is entirely unrelated to
the registrant, however, most registrants create a domain name that is
the same as or closely related to their name or business and register that
as their domain name (provided it is available). Furthermore, users of
the Internet generally believe that the domain name registrant is
associated with the subject of the domain name (especially when the
domain name constitutes a proper noun) even though they are aware of
the first to register system that does not require applicants to have any
association with the subject matter indicated in their domain name.
Moreover, when the domain name is distinctive of the registrant
and the registrant sells goods or service via the web page it created, that
domain name identifies the source or origin of those goods or services
sold on that web page. To determine whether or not the domain name
identifies the source or origin of some good or service, that is, whether
the domain name serves as "use" of an "appellation of source" pursuant
to Articles 2-1-1 and 2-1-2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law, we
must consider the overall appellations of source used on the web page
and the meaning of the words used in the domain name (given the
general understanding as might be arrived at by users of the Internet).
2. In this case, the defendant urges that in determining whether use
of the domain name constitutes "use" of "an appellation of source" we
must consider that after the defendant obtained the domain name
registration, it used the word 'jaccs" as indicated in the Stipulated Facts
above: on the web page, below the title 'Welcome to JACCS' web page,"
the following links were provided: "goods;" "Digital Cell Phone;" and
"Nippon Kaisyo, Inc." The contents of this web page, including the links,
consists of advertising for sale of cellular telephones and other
goods. On the web page, "JACCS" appears prominently. It is the focal
point of the web page. The domain name "jaccs" is merely the lower case
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version of "JACCS" that appears in the web page. As such, the domain
name as used as part of the web page itself functions to distinguish the
source or origin of goods that appear on the web page. Therefore, this
constitutes the "use" of "an appellation of source."
B.

Are the Other Conditions of Article 2-1-2 of that Law Satisfied?

1.

Is the plaintiffs appellation of source famous?
Based on the evidence submitted at trial, we reach the following
conclusions.
The plaintiff is a joint stock corporation in the business of providing
credit card services to individuals. By July 1, 1998, it was operating 124
branch offices. For certain, its original trade name was "Kitanihon
Shinyo Hanbai Kabushikigaisha" [Northern Japan Credit Corporation];
however, in April of 1976 it changed its name to "Jakusu K." "Jakusu"
is the katakana rendition of an acronym formed from "Japan Consumer
Credit Service." In English, it represented this acronym as "JACCS Co.,
K " From this time on, the plaintiff has made continuous use of
JACCS in advertisements in newspapers, pamphlets, TV commercials,
and on employees' business cards. Furthermore, "JACCS Card" is
printed on credit cards issued by the plaintiff. In November of 1976 it
was listed in Division Two of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and in
September of 1978 it was listed in Division One. Also from the mid1970s the plaintiff has continuously advertised its credit services
nationwide via television commercials. These television commercials
end with a picture of JACCS and a voice over saying "jakusu" or "jakusu
card." Also, at first glance one knows that the plaintiffs trademark is
formulated using the letters "J", "A", "C"' , "C", and "S" of the English
alphabet. The average consumer would recognize that this would be
pronounced 'Jakusu." The plaintiff registered its "JACCS" mark in
September of 1997 under Class 36 [various services including life
insurance and credit services] with the Japanese Patent Office. In 1994
it also registered its marks under Class 35 [services of lending
advertising equipment, typewriters, cameras, and word processors],
Class 38 [services of lending telephones, fax machines, and other
communication devices], and Class 42 [service of lending calculators and
related programs].
Therefore, we hold that by 1998 when the defendant commenced use
of the Domain Name, "JACCS" had already become a famous appellation
of source identifying the plaintiff.
2. Is the Domain Name in Dispute Here the Same or Similar to
Plaintiffs Appellation of Source?
As discussed above, the Domain Name, which consists of
http://www.jaccs.co.jp, has several components. The first component of
"http'//www." and the last two components ".co.jp" are used by many and
do not operate to identify the source or origin of some good or
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service. The only portion of the Domain Name that may identify a
business is the Third Level Domain Name, in this case ".jaccs". As such,
we focus our inquiry there.
Comparing "JACCS" with "jaccs," it is clear that the only difference
between the plaintiffs trademark (JACCS) and the Domain Name
(.jaccs) is the fact that the latter appears in lower case letters. This
difference is immaterial and we therefore hold that the Domain Name
is identical to the plaintiffs trademark.
3. Therefore, defendant's use of the Domain Name violates Article 2-12 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law.
C. If an Injunction Regarding the Use of the Domain Name is
Appropriate and Issued, Will This Constitute an Abuse of Rights?
1. We Hereby Conclude the Following Facts Regarding
Defendant's Use and Registration of the Domain Name.

the

a. In mid-July of 1995, after registering the Domain Name, the
defendant communicated with the plaintiff and stated as follows: 'Your
company's mistake might be rectified by selling or renting [the Domain
Name to you]." Once the plaintiff commenced this cause of action by
November 17, 1998, the defendant had also written in communications
to the plaintiff as follows: "It appears now that some of your company's
officials realize the significance of domain names. As stock holders, they
seem especially keen on this issue." 'Your company's presence on the
Internet is shameful and artificial." "If left as is, it will become the
laughing stock of the world."
b. The defendant has created an association of companies with
approximately 10 members. The defendant has named this association
the "japan associated cozy cradle society." It created the Domain Name
from an acronym based on this name. In this name, the terms "cozy
cradle" has absolutely nothing to do with the other words in its
title. They are placed in the title unnaturally and never appear in the
defendant's web page. Rather, the acronym "JACCS" is the focus of the
web page. Also, the defendant added the Japanese pronunciation of this
acronym in furigana2 6 so that the visitor to the web page would see its
intended pronunciation as "jay-ay-si-si-esu" [to distinguish it from the
plaintiffs registered trademark pronunciation of 'Jacks']. This occurred,
however, after the present litigation commenced.
Under these
circumstances, the defendant's registration of the Domain Name was not
incidental. Rather, we hold that such registration was done on purpose
to create a business appellation which was identical to the

26.
Furiganaprovides the proper pronunciation for a Chinese character-kanji.
The pronunciations utilize small kana printed above or alongside the kanji. See id.
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plaintiffs. Furthermore, as stated above, soon after registering the
Domain Name, the defendant began requesting money from the plaintiff.
As such, we cannot come to any other conclusion than that the
defendant registered the Domain Name with the intention of trafficking
such domain name for profit.
2. Therefore, as it is clear from the above that the defendant's use of
the Domain Name is an act of unfair competition, that unless enjoined
it is likely that the defendant will continue such use, that such use
causes confusion with respect to the plaintiffs business appellations and
that it is possible such use will negatively affect the value of plaintiffs
business appellations, we hold that the plaintiffs business interests are
hereby infringed.
Therefore, the defendant is hereby enjoined from using the Domain
Name.
3.

Abuse of Rights
The defendant argues that for the plaintiff to demand an injunction
of its use of the Domain Name, constitutes an abuse of rights as the
plaintiff was not the first entity to register the Domain Name.
While it is true that JPNIC maintains an absolute policy that
domain names are issued on a priority basis, that is a completely
separate issue from whether the defendant has engaged in unfair
competition and as such should be enjoined by a court of
law. Considering the fact that JPNIC could cancel the registration to
any domain name if use of such domain name is enjoined by a court of
law, the registrant of a domain name cannot prevent another party from
seeking an injunction [for unfair competition in a court of law] based on
its prior registration of a domain name. Furthermore, even though the
plaintiff did not register the domain name first, considering the
defendant's conduct in the use and registration of the Domain Name,
this is not a situation where the abuse of rights doctrine should be
applied.
Furthermore, the defendant argues that as the plaintiff has
registered 'jaccscard.cd' as a domain name, the plaintiff would suffer no
inconvenience whatsoever if the defendant prevailed. In this case,
however, the plaintiff did not sue because it was unable to use its
domain name, but rather because the defendant's use of the Domain
Name constituted an act of unfair competition-undermining the value
of plaintiffs business appellation of "JACCS." Therefore, simply because
the plaintiff has the option of using the domain name 'jaccscard.co" does
not mean that an injunction regarding defendant's conduct is
unnecessary.
As such, we hold that the request for an injunction by plaintiff in
this case does not constitute an abuse of rights.
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Should Defendant be Enjoined from Using "JACCS" Anywhere on
Its Web Page?

1. As held above, the plaintiffs business appellation "JACCS" is
famous. It has been already conceded that this business appellation and
the Domain Name registered by the defendant are identical. The
defendant has argued that a detailed comparison is necessary. The only
thing to be compared, however, is the plaintiffs business appellation of
"JACCS." As such, [as there is nothing to be compared] (other than the
upper or lower case letters or their color) we refuse to adopt the
defendant's methodology.
Also, as it is clear that the use of "JACCS" on the defendant's web
page constitutes the "use" of "an appellation of source," defendant's use
of "JACCS" on its web page constitutes an act of unfair competition
prohibited by Article 2-1-2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law.
2. Therefore, when the defendant uses the appellation "JACCS"
anywhere on its web page, there is an apprehension that the plaintiffs
interests will be infringed.
Therefore, the defendant is also hereby enjoined from using
"JACCS" anywhere on its web page.
E.

Accordingly, There is No Reason to Adjudicate the Remaining
Claims of the Defendant and the Plaintiffs Motions are Granted.
It is so ordered.

B. The JACCS Case Commentary
Of course, the primary significance of the JACCS Case is the fact
that it is the first cybersquatting case that has made it through the
Japanese court system. In October of 2000 under the auspices of the
JPNIC (Japan's equivalent to ICANN), a new domain name dispute
resolution policy took effect. 27 This policy is very similar to ICANN's
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy. Japan, however, is unlikely to adopt
a statue similar to the United States' Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act. 28 Rather, the current proposal being considered is to
merely add "domain names" to the types of appellations of source
protected by the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. 29 Therefore, the
current situation is that a trademark owner can file with JPNIC in order
to recover its trademark if registered by another as a domain name in

27.
For the text of this policy in English, see JAPAN NETWORK INFORMATION
CENTER, JP DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (July 19, 2000), at
http://www.nic.ad.jp/en/registdom/docljp-drp-policy-e.html (last visited May 17, 2001).
28.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
29.
See supra note 18.
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bad faith, but must still sue under the Unfair Competition Prevention
Act to obtain injunctive or other relief. Given the JACCS Case as
precedent, the Japanese legislature is likely to proceed rather carefully
and not create a new, sui generis statute to protect domain names.
As such, the plaintiff must show that its trademark is being used in
violation of Article 2-1-2 of the Unfair Competition Law, that is, diluted.
In the JACCS Case, the plaintiff was able to make this showing. To do
so, however, the requirement that the mark was 'Tamous" seems to have
been relaxed to some degree. After all, "JACCS" is not as well known a
mark as Mastercard or Visa. The court, however, found the mark
sufficiently well-known for purposes of the injunction.
Clearly, the fact that the defendant, at least at first, seems to have
intentionally attempted to trade off of the good will of the plaintiffs
mark significantly influenced the court's analysis. In fact, in places, the
court seems simply to not believe the defendant's explanations. They
certainly do seem rather contrived-creative, but contrived nevertheless.
This was not the only hurdle that had to be overcome in order to
apply existing intellectual property law to a cybersquatter. Lost in the
shuffle about whether JACCS is famous enough to warrant this
treatment is the much more basic issue of whether the defendant's use
of the plaintiffs trademark constituted use of something contemplated
by the statute. The court refers to this problem of whether there was a
"use of an appellation of source" by the defendant. That is, if the
defendant's use of the domain name does not identify the source or origin
of some good or service, its use is not trademark infringement nor
dilution but rather a fair use. The court only hints at this issue of fair
use.
The court resolves this issue, as it must, in favor of JACCS;
however, more significant than merely being the first cybersquatting
case or the finding that JACCS is now famous, the court also finds that
the mere use of a trademark in a domain name to be "use of an
appellation of source." That is, the court has determined that a domain
name operates to identify source just like any other "appellation of
source." A domain name is an appellation of source and registering it
and providing the sale of some goods or services using that web cite is
"use' under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.
This case is currently on appeal before the Nagoya High Court. The
High Court's decision is not expected for at least two years. If this case
is not overruled, it may be a significant expansion of trademark and
unfair competition law, not because of its holding regarding the fame of
JACCS, but rather because of its recognition of a domain name as an
appellation of source.
Finally, an interesting claim made here that occasionally arises in
Japanese intellectual property cases is the argument regarding "abuse
of rights." In Japan, as in many Civil Law countries, a plaintiff may
establish that it technically possesses some right by which it can enjoin
the conduct of a defendant; however, the ascertainment of that right may
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be so inherently unfair that to do so would amount to an abuse of that
right. The defendant here unsuccessfully asserts that argument. The
court dismisses it, but raising it at all in these circumstances is
extremely bold and a good example of creative lawyering. The attorneys
recognized that their client apparently adopted a domain name that they
knew would cause confusion regarding the plaintiffs trademark. The
court determined that the defendant had superior rights to the domain
name, however, because of the first to file system.
By rejecting this argument, the court implicitly concludes that
although the first to register system is in effect, the trademark
significance of a domain name will be weighted more heavily than the
fact that someone happened also to register it as a domain name.
VI. CONCLUSION
The principal objective of this Commentary has been to demonstrate
using very specific examples that the Japanese judiciary is alive and well
regarding intellectual property law cases. The analysis in the cases is
inherently rational and predictable. Although further statutory
development is still desirable and likely, the Japanese judiciary
continues to do a perfectly rational job of protecting legitimate
intellectual property. Unfortunately, this in itself may be remarkable
or controversial to some.
Nevertheless, the cases introduced here demonstrate that Japanese
intellectual property case law has become much more accessible via the
Internet. This high level of accessibility is to the consternation,
surprisingly, of some. Before the Internet innovation, there were no
sources where one could immediately obtain judicial opinions on
multiple subjects. Although a few CD-ROM vendors existed (and still
do), these were published intermittently and were rather
expensive. This created a closed community where only libraries and
some (not all) practitioners had access to the relevant cases-a system
similar to how the Dead Sea Scrolls were treated.
More specifically, the cases translated above teach a very important
lesson regarding what is perhaps the greatest misconception by
foreigners who casually consider Japan. Some observers have been
quick to conclude that one can essentialize Japan-that Japan is
predominantly motivated by culture, that duty and responsibility dictate
parties' conduct and judges' decisions, and that there is then something
mysterious about law in Japan where only Japanese could truly
understand it. There is now a significant amount of scholarship
produced by serious Japanese scholars which concludes that the notion
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that "culture is king" in Japan is simply wrong. 30 The cases above bear
that out as well.
For example, some believe that rather than using traditional forms
of remedies, Japanese courts are likely to make the non-prevailing party
in a law suit publish a public apology and order very weak, if any,
sanctions. The theory there is that by making them apologize, they are
somehow humbled and that that public humbling is far worse than any
amount of damages.
In the Konami Case, however, the court ordered the defendant to
pay 2,000,000 yen (approximately $20,000) in damages for violating the
plaintiffs moral rights alone. 31 The court also ordered the master and
any copies of the tape to be destroyed and enjoined the defendant from
further distributing its infringing video. Most significantly, it refused
the plaintiffs request that the defendant publish a public apology. If
culture is king in Japan, one would expect the exact opposite: no, or very
low, monetary damages and an order to apologize.
Lest the Author be accused of exactly what is being criticized
(essentializing Japan based on one anecdotal incident), consider some of
the other cases above regarding this issue. For example, in the
Walkman Case, the Chiba District Court ordered the defendant to cease
its infringing use of the 'Valkman" trademark and pay Sony 3,000,000
yen. 32 Although this converts into a mere $30,000 and therefore does
not seem to be a significant amount, in both this case as well as the
Konami Case, this amount of damages is most likely a devastating
amount to the defendants as they are both private enterprises without
significant amounts of cash on hand.
Furthermore, in the Walkman Case the court took a surprisingly
U.S.-approach: the court looked to the facts, searched for a clear
statutory proscription to what it considered inappropriate conduct by the
defendant, and, finding none, extended existing Japanese trademark law
to legitimate its holding. Where culture is king and Japanese judges are
criticized for mechanically applying statutory language without further
considering the larger ramifications of such rigid adjudication, one would
not expect such an outcome.
Perhaps the best example of the rational extension of statutory law
to fit a perceived harm is the JACCS Case above. 3 3 In order to reach its
conclusion, the court there had to make not one, but two steps into the
unknown. First, the court had to find the JACCS trademark famous
enough to fit the standard set in the statute. More importantly, the
court, without any statutory guidance, had to find the use of a domain
name constituted "use of an appellation of source."

30.

E.g., ERIcA. FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETYAND

HEALTH PoLicY (2000).
31.
See discussion supraPart II.
32.
See discussion supraPart M.
33.
See discussion supraPart V.
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The court took these two steps and closed down the defendant's web
site and ordered the domain name transferred to the plaintiff. Once
again, this is a perfect example of what one expects from rational
judges. Although a literal reading of the statute-or, as in the JACCS
Case a lack of any statutory language at all-might allow the court to
side-step the issue, in the JACCS Case, the court took the entirely
rational course and extended the law where it saw gaps to avoid a clear
injustice.
If this is an example of where culture is king, then U.S. courts are
guilty of the same thing. There is no credible evidence that Japanese
judges are the culture and duty bound automatons they are made out to
be in the West. In fact, even in a Civil Law system where they could be
far less activist, in intellectual property cases, they take rather
extraordinary measures in individual cases to arrive at the just result.
Even when the legislature seems to grant incredibly expansive
rights to trade dress owners, the courts seem capable of rationally
circumscribing the statute's application to fit a general notion of
propriety as opposed to what might be possible under the statute. That
is, in both the Bear's Club Case and the Gibson Guitar Case, the
defendant's conduct was very similar: both defendants intentionally
copied the shape or look and feel of the plaintiffs' products. Although
attorneys for Fernandes (the defendant in the Gibson Guitar Case)
disagree that their client intentionally copied Gibson's guitar, that
position seems fantastic. Without so-called "dead copying," neither
Fernandes' guitars nor the defendant's towel set in the Bear's Club Case
could possibly be so similar simply out of coincidence.
In the Gibson GuitarCase, however, the court very astutely looks
at all of the evidence to conclude that the shape at issue there had, in
Japan, become the generic shape of one type of an electric guitar. Once
again, the startling part of this outcome is the routine nature of the
decision.
The court here is behaving precisely how one would
expect. The court looks to the statute, applies the language of the
statute, and, in so doing, further clarifies the legislative enactment. It
does not concern itself with culture. It does not act as the legislature's
automaton. It rationally considers the law and interprets it to come to
a well-reasoned outcome.
Therefore, intellectual property law is alive and well in Japan.
Judges' opinions are inherently rational and predictable. Thanks to the
Internet, judicial opinions are now accessible. Now, in order to
understand Japanese intellectual property case law, all one needs to do
is read the opinions. The Author hopes the translations above help in
this regard.

